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CLASS LAW IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 
This paper investigates the way in which certain economic and 
financial aspects of working-class life were ordered and regulated by the civil 
law in Victorian England. The law, I will suggest, both embodied and 
justified middle-class views about the latent fecklessness and immorality of 
manual workers and about the latent industry and honesty of the property-
owning classes. These legal interpretations of the different behavioural 
characteristics of the different classes were not new -- the existence of class 
law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been clearly 
demonstrated by a number of social historians. However, the way in which 
class-based legal prejudice was combined with the supposedly value-free 
operation of untrammelled market competition makes the working of class 
law in Victorian times distinct from that of earlier periods. 
I will suggest that at the very time when manual workers were being 
incorporated into the Victorian state structure through a grudging 
recognition of trade union and political rights, they were being actively 
discriminated against in other areas of the civil law. Legal barriers were 
erected in the path of working-class self-help activity and increasingly harsh 
sanction was imposed on any personal financial lapse not because of the 
economic circumstances of manual workers but because of their social class. 
The nature of class division in Victorian society recently has been challenged 
by a number of revisionist historians who identify a flexible and multi-layered 
respectability rather than class as the fulcrum around which social relations 
were articulated.! By contrast this paper argues that there was a deeply 
entrenched middle-class mid-Victorian prej udice against the character and 
behaviour of manual workers as a class, a prejudice which was embodied in 
the civil law and which has exerted a powerful long-term influence on class 
relationships and self-perceptions. Despite the growing acceptance of 
collectivist ideology and action from the 1880s and the public promotion of 
social opportunities via education, housing, health and welfare policies, 
Victorian class law continued to discriminate against many manual workers 
and sustain the moral basis of class division well into the twentieth-century. 
The argument will be developed by looking in turn at the institutional and 
legal constraints on thrift and on personal indebtedness in Victorian 
England, but the paper begins by reviewing historical interpretations of the 
reform of the civil law in nineteenth-century England. 
I 
The civil law in England was transformed in the Victorian period as 
archaic and customary procedures and court structures were replaced by a 
more streamlined, more professional legal system that was better suited to 
the new requirements of a growing industrial urban economy.2 Nowhere was 
this more apparent than in the regulation of economic transactions. 
Customary control of trade through guilds, apprenticeships and monopolies 
was gradually replaced by a more rational regulation under a revised law of 
contract which had no place for the fading vestiges of what Edward 
Thompson has described as the eighteenth-century "moral economy".3 In his 
study of the evolution of freedom of contract in England, Patrick Atiyah has 
noted that: 
[t]here was simply a clash of moralities between the older, 
laxer, more paternal, protective Equity; and the newer 
individualism, stressing risk-taking, free choice, rewards to the 
enterprising and sharp, and devil take the hindmost. 
Throughout the eighteenth century these two moralities co-
existed uneasily; generally the older morality had the upper 
hand at first, but increasingly gave way as the century wore on.4 
According to Atiyah it is in the period 1770-1870 that one can see the 
emergence within the civil law of principles of freedom of trade and 
contract closely associated with the ideals of classical political economy and 
far removed from the traditional concerns of the eighteenth-century "moral 
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economy".5 This was certainly the case at the local level where the amateur 
courts of requests were replaced in 1846 by professional and formal county 
courts which paid little attention to established principles of custom, 
discretion and local participation.6 Not until the late nineteenth-century 
collectivist developments in socia l thought and the Edwardian "new liberal" 
social legislation was the primacy of free-market individualism convincingly 
challenged. In the civil law the protective and ameliorative functions of 
eighteenth-century concepts of equity were reintroduced through forma l 
legislation relating to health, safety, adulteration, hours of work and 
minimum wages. 
This interpretation of the incursion of free-market ideals into social, 
poli tical and legal thought in Victorian England is long established.7 but it 
is not necessarily well established. This paper will attempt to demonstrate 
that in one area of law and practice, the small but crucial area relating to the 
money management of the working class, the free market was reined-in 
before it had a chance to develop. A contract economy -- one in which all 
economic actors are treated according to the same free-market rules -- was 
rapidly made subservient to moral prejudice. Economic actions undertaken 
by people of different social standing became regulated in different ways 
because of a priori value judgements about the character traits of the 
different classes. 
Class law, of course, was not new to England. The class bias in both 
the criminal and civil law in eighteenth-century England has been well 
documented. It was a bias that included discrimination in the definition of 
crimes and misdemeanours, in the prosecution of defendants from different 
socio-economic backgrounds, and in the corrective treatment of offenders.s 
But nineteenth-century law reform, on both the civil and criminal sides, was 
intended to produce a more rational, formal and equitable legal system. 
This was particularly the case in the law of contract, where arbitrary or 
historical rights and entitlements were gradually replaced by a more genera l 
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law relating to bargains openly entered into by the contracting parties.9 A 
developing sense of legal formalism was supposed to ensure equal treatment 
before the law for the economic actors who made their agreements in the 
free market. But despite this legal rhetoric (which reflected, no doubt, the 
sincere beliefs of many lawyers), the practice was different. In many aspects 
of both the civil law and of public administrative practice which touched the 
economic and financial affairs of the working class, new biases against the 
interests of workers were deliberately introduced by parliament and the 
courts. Furthermore these biases became incorporated within the social 
norms not just of the legal establishment, but of the population as a whole, 
thereby legitimizing the underlying class prejudice. 
In order to analyze these developments, the next two sections of this 
paper will focus on the self-help activities of manual workers, and will show 
the way in which legislation and procedure relating to working-class thrift 
and personal indebtedness incorporated class bias. The final section will 
then suggest why this class bias was generally accepted rather than contested, 
even by manual workers and their representatives, and will examine the 
implications of this argument for revisionist interpretations of class divisions 
in Victorian society. 
11 
In so far as Victorian middle-class advocates of working-class thrift 
acknowledged any class bias in the operation of thrift institutions, it was in 
a positive sense of the poor being encouraged in their self-help efforts 
through subsidization and charitable assistance. Much play was made of the 
generous labours of middle-class trustees in managing trustee savings banks 
for use by the labouring poor, of favourable tax arrangements allowed to 
working-class saving institutions, and of the positive institutional and legal 
encouragement given by the state to the thrift activities of the labouring 
population. lO 
However, if we look in detail at the institutional arrangement of 
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working-class thrift, the structure and mode of operation appears to be far 
from beneficent. The thrift institution that perhaps most directly appears to 
be the embodiment of semi-official philanthropy is the Post Office Savings 
Bank (P.O.S.B.), established by the government in 1861 with the express 
purpose of promoting working-class thrift. ll With more than one million 
accounts opened in the first decade of operation, and over nine million 
accounts in existence and £187 million of savings accumulated by the eve of 
the First World War. the P.O.S.B. was clearly a highly successful exercise in 
the state sponsorship of thrift. Much of this savings effort came from 
working-class people: figures for 1899 show that 83 per cent of accounts were 
for sums under £25, with an average value per account of just £4 .12 
The P.O.S.B. was a popular institution; was this popularity a 
consequence of indirect state subsidization of small-scale thrift, of quasi-
official philanthropy? By acting as guarantor of P.O.S.B. funds the 
government ensured that this form of saving was virtually risk-free, 
something which was certainly not the case with pub and club-based saving 
schemes, nor even with the trustee savings banks, which were occasionally 
subject to fraud on the part of actuaries and managers. 13 This guarantee of 
security, however, was far from being a new departure for the government, 
because it had been providing identical guarantees to middle-class investors 
for many decades through the sale of government bonds at fixed rates of 
interest. If this was quasi-official philanthropy, then it was a form of 
philanthropy enjoyed overwhelmingly by the Victorian bourgeoisie. 
If we examine the financial returns enjoyed by P.O.S.B. depositors, 
then it is apparent that they were not treated particularly favourably by the 
government. The P.O,S.B. paid interest at 2.5 per cent per annum on every 
whole £1 invested for a full twelve-month period. There was no philanthropy 
here. The P.O.S.B. interest rate remained unaltered throughout the period 
to 1914, whilst the yield on consols reached a high of 3.4 per cent and for 
only three years touched a low of 2.5 per cent. For thirty-three of the fifty-
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two years that the P.O.S.B. operated before the First World War the yield 
on Consols was 3 per cent or above, giving the P.O.S.B. managers a cosy '/2 
per cent or more to devote to administrative costS.14 This allowance for 
administration was intentional; the 1858 report of the select committee on 
savings banks which examined proposals for state sponsorship of working-
class thrift was very clear in its recommendation that 'the payment of interest 
and the expense of management ought not to be an annual loss to the 
State'.'5 Accounts for the P.O.S.B. show that it made a tidy profit; by 1868, 
just seven years after foundation, it had accumulated a surplus of over 
£200,000, a surplus ultimately appropriated by the Commissioners for the 
Reduction of the National Debt. Between 1880 and 1900 the P.O.S.B. paid 
over £1.6 million to the exchequer; the subsidization was from poor savers 
to rich tax-payers.16 
It may be possible to ascribe this cross-subsidization to historical 
chance and inertia or to lower than expected administrative costs and a 
paternalistic desire not to confuse working-class savers by altering the rate 
of interest paid. The positive argument in favour of the fixed rate of interest 
in the P.O.S.B. is that it did give working-class savers a guaranteed return 
even when market rates were low. In the 1890s the yield on Consols fell to 
only 2.5 per cent, so the P.O.S.B. actually ran at a loss, with the expenses of 
management covered from accumulated surpluses. However, as Avner Offer 
has shown, this was simply a different form of cross-subsidization from the 
poor to the rich. At 2.5 per cent, the Consols yield was well below that 
available on alternative investments. In consequence, almost the only 
purchaser of Consols by the mid-1890s was the P.O.S.B., a position that was 
repeated with Irish Land Stock in the Edwardian period. 17 Working-class 
savers were forced by P.O.S.B. managers to lend to the government at 
interest rates well below market levels, and the net effect of this was to 
reduce the debt-servicing bill of middle-class tax-payers. 
This was quite intentional. The government had been taken to task 
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by the 1858 select committee for manipulating trustee savings banks funds 
in the interests of the national exchequer rather than the interests of the 
depositors, but was quite open about its desire to do the same with P.O.S.B. 
monies. In an acrimonious debate in the House of Commons at the 
committee stage of the P.O.S.B. bill, Gladstone admitted that P.O.S.B. funds 
were likely to be moved between government stock to suit the revenue-
raising interests of the government of the day. In his view, as long as the 2.5 
per cent interest continued to be paid on deposits, ' the less the depositors 
knew about anything else the better'.18 However, this unfavourable reward 
for thrift offered by the P.O.S.B. to working-class savers was not the only 
element of class discrimination embodied in the working of this institution. 
Equally important was the restriction deliberately placed on access to 
accumulated savings. 
Until 1893 depositors had to wait for several days between requesting 
a withdrawal of funds and receiving the money. The reason for this was 
partly procedural -- the deposit book had to be forwarded by post to the 
ledger department in London to be checked with central records, the sum 
required for withdrawal was deducted from both, the deposit book was 
posted back to the initiating post office, and the book and money would then 
be handed over to the patient depositor. 19 But there was a deliberate 
attempt at moral control in this system; the delay was a way of imposing 
forward planning and deferred gratification on working-class savers. This 
point was made very clearly by Acton Ayrton, the Liberal member for Tower 
Hamlets, during the Commons debate on the P.O.S.B. Bill: "the great object 
of the savings banks had hitherto been to withdraw from men the temptation 
of spending their money by interposing a little difficulty and delay in getting 
it out of the bank".20 When the controller of the P.O.S.B. proposed the 
introduction of a withdrawal-on-demand system for sums not exceeding £1 , 
there was considerable opposition on the grounds that this would increase 
the costs of administration, increase opportunities for fraud on the part of 
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working-class depositors, and enable these depositors to dissipate their 
savings without proper forethoughtY There was little official appreciation 
of how valuable this instant access to savings might be for poor families 
wishing to pay rent or buy food, despite the fact that the point had been 
made many times by witnesses to the various select committees on savings 
banks,22 nor of how discriminatory was a banking system that allowed 
middle-class customers of the clearing banks to withdraw on demand or even 
to run up an overdraft, but which prevented working-class customers of the 
P.O.S.B. from enjoying the same entitlements. The extent of working-class 
need was shown in 1905, when withdrawal-on-demand was introduced in the 
P.O.S.B .. In the first full year of operation, this system accounted for over 
half of all cash withdrawals. 
In establishing small savings facilities throughoutthe country, including 
areas hitherto lacking a local trustee savings bank, the Post Office Savings 
Bank served to provide state sponsorship of working-class thrift , but it also 
produced subsidies from working-class savers to the national exchequer. At 
one time it looked as if these subsidies might become in effect a tax on 
electoral participation for the working class; proposals for a savings bank 
franchise were advanced in 1854, 1859, 1866 and 1867 and were variously 
supported by Lord John Russell, Palmerston, Disraeli and Gladstone.23 The 
public rhetoric surrounding the foundation of the P.O.S.B. suggested that 
this was an institution that existed outside the normal rules of laissez-faire 
market competition, and the rhetoric was right, but not in the way believed 
at the time. By underpaying depositors, the P.O.S.B. acted as an instrument 
of state-controlled taxation of poor savers, and by embodying value 
judgements about the character traits of working-class savers, it imposed 
moral and economic restraints on small savers which would not have been 
countenanced by the wealthy. 
Value judgements about the latent beastliness of the working class 
were even more apparent in the regulation of another type of working-class 
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thrift -- the purchase of life assurance. Industrial assurance stood well 
beyond the boundaries of state welfare throughout the Victorian and 
Edwardian periods, and it was only in 1948 that a £20 death grant was 
introduced as part of the Beveridge national insurance scheme. No-one 
could level the accusation of quasi-official philanthropy against the 
companies and friendly societies that organised the practically universal 
insurance of the working population by the end of the nineteenth century 
(although the charge would be valid for the ordinary life assurance 
companies selling policies to the middle class, since from 1853 these policies 
enjoyed the privilege of tax relief).24. By 1900 the accumulated penny-a-week 
premiums had established a capital fund of over £26m in working-class 
insurance organisations.25 The state provided no subsidy but took no cut; 
this was self-contained working-class self-help. Working-class families were 
not, however, allowed to pursue this effort at thrift untouched by the value 
judgements of middle-class legislators because of a belief, ultimately 
enshrined in legislation, that the baseness of many elements within the 
working class left them only one step away from infanticide. 
In 1846 parliament forbade any insurance on the life of a child under 
6 years of age by the inclusion of a restrictive clause in the Friendly Societies 
Act of that year; in 1850 insurance of children under ten years of age was 
limited to a maximum of £3.26 In 1855 this restriction was relaxed, and 
insurance up to £6 was allowed on children under 5 years of age, and up to 
£10 on children aged 5 to 10, but the issue was raised again during the Royal 
Commission on Friendly Societies in the early 1870s, when the claim was 
made that the high infant mortality rates and extensive infant life insurance 
in Lancashire was proof that children were being deliberately killed for 
cash.27 The foundation of the London Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children in 1884, and the National Society four years later, gave further 
impetus to a new round of allegations. At the 1888 select committee on 
friendly societies the Hon. E. Lyulph Stanley, former assistant commissioner 
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to the 1874 royal commission, proclaimed that infant insurance in some cases 
leads to murder and often leads to negligence,28 and in the following year the 
Rev. Benjamin Waugh, director of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children continued the argument. "The impression of our committee", he 
told a group of MPs, "is that infant life insurance is a direct incentive to the 
destruction of infant life", and a number of coroners came forward to 
support this assertion.29 Mr Athelstan Hicks, the deputy coroner for Surrey, 
admitted that: 
I cannot prove perhaps absolutely anything certain, or I should 
send the cases for trial; but the general impression was that 
there did seem to be at times a larger amount of negligence or 
carelessness with children who were insured than otherwise 
might have been expected.3o 
Indeed, no-one seemed to be able to produce any firm evidence to 
support this calumny on working-class parents, but that did not prevent the 
introduction by the Bishop of Peterborough of a bill to the House of Lords 
in 1890 proposing that any sums payable on the death of young children 
should be handed direct to the undertaker and not to the parents or 
guardians who had paid the premiums. Some of the evidence presented to 
the select committee appointed to consider this bill is illuminating, if only for 
its extremism. Doctors, coroners and judges concurred that infant life 
insurance put temptation in the path of the poor. Sidney Barwise, former 
parish doctor for the Birmingham Poor Law Union, became convinced that 
"the chief anxiety of the parents was to see the child dead from the moment 
of its birth". When asked how much money in terms of payout was necessary 
to induce wilful neglect on the part of parents, he replied "a very few 
shillings; anything sufficient for a drink".31 The Honourable Sir Alfred Wills, 
a high court judge, held much the same view: "I think it would be the idlest 
affectation to doubt that there are not a few parents in this country who 
would starve their children for Ss. a-piece".32 And Henry Hooper, the 
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Coroner of Exeter, was bold enough to use a term that others shied away 
from when he ventured that child life insurance was "an incentive to cruel 
neglect, and what is, morally speaking, murder".33 
This vicious slur on working-class parents drew an eloquent denial 
from the one manual worker called to give evidence, Will Crooks. His 
reading of working-class motives was very different: 
I find always mothers willing and very ready to make every 
sacrifice to keep their children alive, and it seems to me to be 
the case that the most thrifty of the very poor always insure. I 
do not find in my experience anyone who has not that maternal 
affection for their children which it seems to be the general 
opinion that we lack as poor people.34 
Whether it was the sentiments of Will Crooks or the business lobbying of 
wi tnesses from the Prudential, Royal Liver, Liverpool Victoria and other 
insurance organisations which persuaded the select committee to maintain 
the status quo is unclear, but no further changes were made to the 
regulations restricting infant and child assurance until after the First World 
War. Nevertheless, the financial limits, and the moral implications of these 
remained. Legislation enshrined a middle-class belief that the customs and 
habits of many workers were so base that they would be prepared to kill 
their children for an insurance pay-out of just £6. 
Restrictive legislation, institutional structures and operational practices 
in Victorian thrift institutions all worked to enshrine a particular view of the 
immaturity and potential viciousness of working-class savers. These middle-
class value judgements prompted the discriminatory regulation of the thrift 
activities of the working population. Neutral market relationships were 
adjusted and constrained not in accordance with any pre-industrial "moral 
economy" tradition that the poverty of the poor justified compassion, but in 
a new tradition, a creation of the Victorian period, that the poverty of the 
poor necessarily justified suspicion, and often implied guilt. 
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III 
The regulation of thrift, however, was almost benevolent when 
compared to the regulation of indebtedness that was revised and elaborated 
during Victoria's reign. The differential treatment meted out to debtors 
from different classes is perhaps the clearest example of the laws and 
institutions of the market being driven by value judgements about the worth 
of the middle class and the fecklessness of the workers. 
Laws relating to debt and bankruptcy in England and Wales 
underwent repeated changes throughout the nineteenth century, but the 
crucial developments occurred in the 1860s with bankruptcy acts in 1861 and 
1869 and the well-known Debtors Act, also in 1869, which supposedly 
abolished imprisonment for debt.35 As Gerry Rubin has pointed out in his 
excellent study of this legislation, these enactments appeared to represent the 
triumph of rational economic calculus over punitive barbarism in the 
regulation and recovery of debt: 
the abolition of imprisonment for debt and the expansion of 
bankruptcy proceedings were two sides of the same coin, in that 
the structural principles of bankruptcy law on the one hand and 
of civil proceedings against the body on the other, stand in 
contradiction to one another. While the object of the former 
is to enable creditors to share equitably and to permit debtors 
to undergo a laundering process, offering them the opportunity 
of a fresh start free from debt, the object of committals was, by 
contrast, to substitute imprisonment for payment of debt. The 
former procedure aimed to be economically rational, the latter 
to be punitive or obstructive to economic efficiency.36 
In theory the equality and openness required in a contract economy had 
been established, but in practice new moral constraints were introduced into 
laws regulating indebtedness with the result that the poor were in effect 
criminalized for their poverty and forced to repay all they owed, whilst 
12 
middle-class and entrepreneurial debtors were protected from their creditors 
and absolved of a large proportion of their debt. 
The value judgements embodied in the law can best be revealed 
through a brief discussion of the ways in which debtors of different types 
were processed by the legal system. From 1847, when the county court 
system was established, small debts (defined as those under £20 to 1850, 
under £50 to 1902 and under £100 thereafter) could be recovered by the 
creditor entering a plaint with the local court. Throughout the period up to 
the First World War the overwhelming majority of cases (over 98 per cent) 
were for sums under £20, with an average amount owing of £3,37 Few 
detailed court records have survived, but those for West Hartlepool for 1910 
show that 28 per cent of plaints were for sums under lOs, 50 per cent for 
sums under £1 , 75 per cent for sums under £2.38 The number of claims and 
people processed by this county court system was enormous -- in 1904, for 
instance, almost 1.4 million plaints were initiated, and these plaints were 
brought primarily against working-class men. The West Hartlepool court 
registers show that 40 per cent of defendants were labourers, 20 per cent 
worked in the engineering industry, 25 per cent had manual jobs of some 
other kind, whereas only 4 per cent were clerks or insurance agents and 6 
per cent traders or dealers of some kind. 
What conception of the legal process did these working-class debtors 
gain from their court experience? Rough and summary justice is probably 
the best description. Once a plaint had been entered in the court book a 
summons was served on the defendant stating the substance of the action 
and the date of a court hearing. When the case came to court it was seldom 
decided in the interests of the defendant -- his chances were never better 
than 2:100 and usually nearer 1:100 throughout the period. The unlikelihood 
of winning the case and the cost of losing a day's wages persuaded many 
defendants not to attend these initial hearings and if they did attend they 
were given scant opportunity to explain their circumstances; in West 
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Hartlepool cases were heard and judgements were dispensed at the rate of 
one every 85 seconds. Judgements normally awarded the full claim plus 
costs to the creditor; costs and fees typically amounted to something over 30 
per cent of the value of the debt.39 
Compare this with middle-class debtors. Traders and, from 1861, non-
traders who owed substantial debts could file a petition in bankruptcy. 
Debtors had to be fairly wealthy in order to go bankrupt, because a £10 fee 
was charged in order to file a petition for bankruptcy, a figure somewhat 
greater than the average per capita financial resources of working-class 
adults in the late-Victorian and Edwardian period.40 Bankruptcy status 
protected the assets of the debtor from summary seizure by the creditors, 
and also wrote off much of the debt, because if the bankrupt paid out of his 
existing assets lOs. in the £, or a lesser composition acceptable to his 
creditors, he was discharged. It was argued that the rules of bankruptcy 
were required both to ensure a speedy and efficient distribution of assets to 
creditors, and to provide some protection of house and home for the 
bankrupt and his dependents. Implicit in these rules was the idea that the 
bankrupt was an unfortunate victim of market pressures, and the low level 
of composition required to discharge the debt was a strong incentive for 
creditors to extend further credit in the hope of achieving full repayment 
rather than force foreclosure. In consequence the number of bankruptcies 
was quite small -- in 1897, for instance, there were 7282 bankruptcies, 
compared with over 1.1 million plaints for recovery of small debts. 
It was not just the very different financial treatment, with smaJl 
debtors paying 100 per cent of the debt plus costs, and bankrupts paying 
usuaJly only 10s. in the £, and sometimes much less, that led some radical 
commentators to describe the laws relating to recovery of debt as class 
laws.41 More important, perhaps, was the way in which the courts effectively 
criminalized poor debtors whilst deliberately preventing the criminalization 
of middle-class bankrupts. In 1844 legislation had been enacted to abolish 
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imprisonment of small debtors for debts of less than £20, but immediately 
a campaign began to reinstate imprisonment for small debts, in the belief 
that the poor of the nation would use this release from the threat of 
imprisonment wilfully to run up extensive debts with traders. 42 An article in 
the Westminster Review in 1845 claimed that "immense sums were at once 
confiscated, and a state of lawless fraud and imposture destroyed many 
honourable traders".43 
The poor, it was believed, were naturally scheming and naturally 
dishonest, and the law should take account of this latent characteristic in 
order to protect the interest of middle-class traders. Parliament soon 
succumbed to the pressure -- in 1845 an act was passed which effectively 
criminalized the poor borrower by allowing courts to imprison for 40 days a 
small debtor guilty of fraud in contracting a debt or of having wilfully 
contracted it without any reasonable prospect of being able to pay. As 
Rubin says, this was a prospect which the poor must have confronted every 
day -- indeed it was the lack of any reasonable prospect of paying that drove 
the poor into debt in the first place. This was widely recognised by county 
court judges; they agreed that "that upon which the labouring classes obtain 
credit is, beyond all question, not their realised property but their presumed 
ability to payout of future earnings.,,44 But since future earnings were, in 
Victorian England, inevitably precarious and contingent, especially for those 
who were driven to contracting a debt by a period of under or 
unemployment, it was seldom possible for worlcing-class debtors to 
demonstrate a reasonable prospect of paying. From the behaviour of 
worlcing-class debtors the courts inferred a criminal intent and punished with 
criminal sanction what was in fact a structural condition of worlcing-class 
poverty. 
This did not change even with the complete abolition of imprisonment 
for debt in 1869 because a new twist was introduced which allowed worlcing-
class debtors to be imprisoned for contempt of court. Debtors could still be 
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incarcerated for up to 6 weeks if they defaulted on payments to creditors, 
and if it could be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the defaulter 
either at the time of default or at some time since the date of the judgement 
had possessed the means to pay, and had refused or neglected to pay. In 
other words, if an instalment of the debt was not made on time, and if it 
could be demonstrated that at any time since the first court hearing the 
debtor had been in receipt of an income which permitted some discretionary 
expenditure -- for instance 'where it has been clearly proved that the debtor 
was spending money on drink' -- then the debtor was guilty of contempt.45 
The possibility that at the time of default the debtor might again be 
unemployed and penniless was irrelevant to the decision. And even if the 
debtor was imprisoned, he still had to pay. Under the old law of 
imprisonment for debt, the prison sentence purged the debt; under the new 
law, imprisonment purged the contempt of court, but the debt still remained 
unsatisfied until repayment was made. In effect the sanction of law became 
more, not less, severe in 1869.46 
Between 1869 and the First World War there were three enquiries 
into this effective continuation of imprisonment for debt, but no change in 
the law -- indeed, the procedure was not abolished until 1970. Although not 
all county court judges supported the system, the majority felt that the 
authority of the law and the courts would be fundamentally weakened if the 
power to imprison were removed. Judge Whitmore in Southwark had put 
the case very clearly in the 1860s, and legal opinion had shifted little before 
the First World War: 
An universal system of ready money payment among the 
working-classes is impossible. The credit they obtain is on the 
faith of repayment not out of assets which can be touched by a 
fi . fa. but out of their periodical earnings, and this tacit 
engagement between the parties can only be enforced, in the 
majority of cases, by fear of imprisonment.47 
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The procedure of debt repayment adopted by the county courts widened still 
further the disparity between the treatment of middle-class bankrupts and 
worki ng-class debtors. Once a petition in bankruptcy was filed, a bankrupt's 
subsequent income was untouched by the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Bankruptcy was a way of distributing existing assets to creditors, not a way 
of imposing some sort of attachment to the bankrupt's future earnings. But 
the system of repayment by instalment used in the county courts was a direct 
imposition on the worker's future income, an imposition which in some 
instances could run for many months. 
The va lue judgements embodied in the laws of debt and bankruptcy 
were stark : middle-class individuals and traders who petitioned for 
bankruptcy did so because they wished honestly to repay, to the best of their 
ability, debts often unwittingly acquired because of fluctuations in trading 
conditions, whereas working-class small debtors ended up in court because 
of a fundamental lack of desire and intention to honour debts they had 
willingly entered into. Whilst the rhetoric of nineteenth-century law reform 
emphasised the simplification and standardization of the law to fit the new 
requirements of a competitive market economy, the practice was quite 
different. Value judgements about the distinct moral characteristics of 
working and middle-class people were embodied in legal enactments and 
procedures which underpinned a new type of class-conscious economic 
regulation created in the mid-Victorian years. 
IV 
Both the institutional structures and the legal procedures relating to 
working-class thrift and indebtedness in Victorian England embodied class 
bias. The bias existed both in terms of behavioura l assumptions and in terms 
of outcomes. But such bias must have some congruence with social norms 
if it is to endure. Edward Thompson has pointed out that "[i] f the law is 
evidently partial and unjust. then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, 
contribute nothing to any class's hegemony".48 How was it that the partiality 
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of the law became incorporated within social norms instead of becoming a 
focus for effective opposition and dissent? 
There are, I think, three reasons for this, which operated at the 
societal, organizational and individual levels of awareness and belief. The 
assumed behavioural characteristics of the working class that became 
incorporated in law and legal procedures -- their fecklessness, dishonesty, 
inability to plan ahead or defer gratification -- were consistent with a 
powerful class characterisation derived from evolutionary biology and 
influential across a broad range of political and social thought. In her study 
of the influence of social darwinism on English thought, Greta Jones has 
noted that: 
a contradiction existed between the theory oflegal, political and 
economic equality and the existence of hierarchy. When it 
came to describing subordination the Victorians took much of 
their imagery from an area where subordination was legitimised 
-- that of the family. Thus they intertwined the language of 
political and legal equality with that of the family to find a 
means of reconciling the fact of subordination with the precepts 
of a system which theoretically rejected it. Thus they talked in 
terms of dependence, of development, of benevolent and 
paternal supervision and of the "child" or the childlike qualities 
of "primitive" people.49 
This type of biological analogy, in which blacks and the working class 
were put in their place on the evolutionary hierarchy in the position of the 
morally "unfit" or "immature" was not restricted to the recondite writings of 
men of letters and science. In 1859, the year Darwin published his Origin 
of the Species, Samuel Smiles produced his popular study of conduct and 
perseverance, Self-Help, which sold tv.'enty thousand copies in its first year, 
fifty-five thousand by the end of five years, and reached its seventy-second 
impression in its centenary year. 50 "Any class of men that lives from hand 
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to mouth will ever be an inferior class", Smiles told his respectable and 
aspiring audience, and then linked hierarchy to biology by noting that 
"[e]conomy also means the power of resisting present gratification for the 
purpose of securing a future good, and in this light it represents the 
ascendency of reason over the animal instincts".5l The following year, and 
with Darwin's work very much in the limel ight, he was able to develop the 
evolutionary argument further : 
Wise economy is not a natural instinct, but the growth of 
reflection, and often the product of experience. Prodigality is 
much more natural to man. Thus the savage is the greatest 
spendthrift, for he has no forethought, no to-morrow, and lives 
only for the day or for the hour. Hence the clever workman, 
unless he be trained in good habits, may exhibit no higher a life 
than that of the mere animal; and the earning of increased 
wages will only furnish such persons with increased means of 
indulging in the gratification of the grosser appetites.52 
This evolutionary metaphor swept into all areas of social thought, 
more often carrying forward the moral elitism of Spencer than the 
evolutionary socialism of Hobs on. Not even the dismal science was immune; 
in 1879 Alfred Marshall suggested that: 
if the lower classes of Englishmen multiply more rapidly than 
those which are morally and physically superior, not only will 
the population of England deteriorate. but also that part of the 
population of America and Australia which descends from 
Englishmen will be less intelligent than it otherwise would be.53 
Admittedly some resistance to the implications of social biology remained 
among evangelicals. but they had their own explanations for the moral and 
behavioural inferiority of the lower orders. At the societallevel, therefore, 
there was an overwhelming reinforcement of the prej udicial beliefs about the 
moral characteristics of the working class that had become enshrined in the 
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laws and institutions regulating their efforts at money management. 
At the organizational level there were also enormous barriers to any 
effective challenge to the class prejudices of the civil law. Thomas Wright 
regarded the discriminatory treatment of bankrupts and debtors as one of 
the "things that sting and rankle, that perpetuate and intensify class jealousy 
and hatred"54, and Robert Knight, general secretary of the Boilermakers' 
Society spoke several times at the Trades Union Congress in the 1870s and 
1880s about the need for law reform, particularly relating to the 
imprisonment of small debtors55. In 1873 the TUC's Parliamentary 
Committee fleetingly raised the issue of the widespread imprisonment of 
debtors as a possible subject for legislative action in the next session of 
Parliament, but this was dropped, along with all other non-industrial items, 
from the list the TUC subsequently submitted to candidates in the 1874 
general election.56 The attitude of the union movement towards the law was 
ambivalent. As Henry PeUing has shown, sectional interests divided union 
leaders over whether to entrust wage determination to the legal apparatus 
of arbitration courts,5? and a general inclination to steer clear of the 
expensive and prejudiced legal system was tempered by important political 
and industrial concerns. From the 1860s to the First World War, trade 
unions were required repeatedly to seek legal justification of their 
organisational integrity and protection of their financial position. The 
several successes they scored in court judgements and in the subsequent 
formulation of trade union law showed that the prejudice of the law was 
neither blind nor absolute. And specific legal developments in the field of 
employers' liability and workmen's compensation demonstrated that a small 
incursion of the rule of law in industrial matters could bring real financial 
advantages to some of their own needy members. 
The early Labour Party was likewise hamstrung by its commitment to 
gradualist reform through the formal process of parliamentary representation 
and legislation; wholesale law reform was hardly compatible with either the 
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party's parliamentary designs or with the deeply-rooted "ideology of rights" 
which existed in British working-class culture.58 Furthermore, the dense 
associational life of working-class men in unions, friendly societies, sports 
clubs and chapels gave a very practical lesson in the need for and utility of 
fixed and formal rules of conduct and hierarchy. Some friendly societies 
made an indulgence of antiquated rules full of odd customs which imposed 
capricious fines on members who failed to show due respect for the 
established customs.59 In the rules of working-class associations, as in the 
civil law, traditionalism, formalism, and the opinion of high authority were 
the norm. 
Finally, at the individual level , there was a genuine (though no doubt 
limited) belief in the ability of the law to provide justice. In the early 
Victorian period it has been found that "the working class made considerable 
use of the system of prosecution, predominantly to prosecute property 
offences committed against themselves."60 Working-class people also made 
use of the small debt courts; the West Hartlepool plaint books show that in 
a small proportion of cases (2-3 per cent of the total) manual workers 
appear as plaintiffs, using the courts to enforce payments by lodgers or the 
repayment of small loans.61 
The class bias that existed in the laws and practices regulating 
working-class thrift and indebtedness acquired a social legitimacy, therefore, 
because of its accordance with the dominant social ideology that explained 
and justified social hierarchy in terms of evolving economic and moral 
fitness, and because of the inability of working-class people, either 
collectively or individually, to articulate a convincing opposition to the legal 
formalism on which this class bias rested. In this sense, therefore, the 
prejudices of the civil law became incorporated in a Victorian social morality 
which acted against the economic interests of the working class, but in which 
the working class acquiesced. 
This interpretation challenges those revisionist historians who argue 
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that class harmony and the quest for respectability rather than class 
antagonism was the dominant social characteristic of mid-Victorian England. 
Michael Thompson talks of "the working classes ... settling down to urban 
living and to industrial work, incorporating these conditions into a normal 
and accepted pattern of living, carving out for themselves an honourable 
place in the new society"Y Gertrude Himmelfarb has an even more positive 
view of the social position of manual workers: 
the stigma that had attached to poverty in the aftermath of the 
New Poor Law and in the turmoil of the thirties and forties 
gradually disappeared; whatever stigma remained was reserved 
for the dependent and unrespectable poor, those who existed 
on the margins of or were outcasts from society. The bulk of 
the poor, the "working classes" as they were increasingly called, 
were seen as respectable, deserving, worthy, endowed with the 
puritan virtues which had served the middle classes so well, and 
which were shortly to earn the working classes that coveted 
badge of respectability, the suffrage.63 
More recently Himmelfarb has argued that the moral expectations 
embodied in late-Victorian middle class social attitudes were not" lofty or 
exalted", that "[t]hese virtues depended on no special breeding, talent, 
sensibility or even money. They were common, everyday virtues, within the 
capacity of ordinary people".64 In the light of the evidence surveyed in this 
paper, it would seem that these revisionist historians present a misleading 
"one nation" Tory-progressive interpretation of Victorian middle-class 
attitudes. 
In practice, the poor were not seen as respectable and endowed with 
middle-class puritan virtues. Although middle-class thoughts about middle-
class morals clearly did change in a liberal direction in this mid-Victorian 
period, the morals of the poor were kept quite distinct. Boyd Hilton has 
traced this reformation of middle-class attitudes towards money, trade and 
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debt. "Liberal Tory or Peelite economists", he notes, "had regarded debt as 
sinful, and their dear money policies had been designed to make things 
difficult for those who sinned", but new economic opportunities and the new 
economic problems of regular fluctuati ons in the trade cycle demanded a 
new moral outlook. Reform of the bankruptcy and debt laws and the 
introduction of limited liability marked the victory of this new moral view, 
but, as Hilton has noted, these reforms "can be stigmatized as a gross 
example of middle-class selfishness".65 
The mora l legitimation of middle-class default encapsulated by the 
bankruptcy and limited liability legislation can be seen as "the moment when 
the middle classes suddenly opted out of the capitalist system at the point 
where it stood to damage themselves. Hitherto they had been able to justify 
its inequality with the thought that they were not only more diligent and 
resourceful, but also more daring than the workers, and consequently more 
vulnerable".66 But from the late 1860s the stark inequality that was 
incorporated in the institutional and legal regulation of thrift and 
indebtedness could no longer be justified by the economics of differential 
risk. It instead came to be justified by the alleged difference in the moral 
characteristics of the rich and the poor. Far from manual workers being 
seen as endowed with middle class puritan virtues, they were repeatedly 
characterized in juridical discussion and in more general middle-class social 
discourse as morally different in a fundamentally inferior way. This was a 
deeply divisive class outlook, but it was projected from above rather than 
below, an attitude much more of middle class exclusion than of working-class 
ambition. 
Legal discrimination against workers pervaded many other areas of the 
civil law -- for instance with respect to gambling, drinking and divorce -- but 
this paper has focused specifically on the money management of the working 
class because this activity, above all others, should have been the least 
subject to any kind of moral imposition in a genuine contract economy. In 
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practice the economic activities of workers were consistently regulated in 
accordance with middle-class prejudices about the character weaknesses of 
the masses, and these middle-class moral prejudices assumed the position of 
general social norms. No doubt these norms held greater sway in the Inns 
of Court and the London clubs than in the workingmen's clubs and local 
inns, but they appear seldom to have been seriously challenged before the 
Second World War. 
Even after the war the moral precepts of the mid-Victorian legislation 
continued to hold sway in the legal establishment, though increasingly they 
appeared to be at odds with broader social attitudes. Atiyah explains the 
ideological conservatism of the law thus: 
when lawyers encounter ideas from outside the law, as they do 
from time to time, they tend to absorb a smattering of these 
ideas which may then remain with them, handed down from 
generation to generation, until they emerge from their narrow 
professional interests to look at the same problem perhaps fifty 
or a hundred years later.67 
In the case of working-class debtors, it took 101 years for the theoretical 
abolition of imprisonment for small debts in 1869 to be made a reality. 
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